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1. Introduction 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have emerged as a dynamic force in the 
development of the Vietnamese economy since the launching of the doi moi reform process in 
1986. The potential and significance of the SME-sector stand, however, in marked contrast to 
the lack of detailed understanding of the factors behind firm growth and survival in this rapidly 
growing East-Asian economy. According to the General Statistics Office (GSO, 2004), formally 
registered enterprises contributed around 45% of GDP in 1995, and by 2001 this share had 
increased to 53%. Of this contribution, state enterprises, the non-state sector and foreign 
invested companies accounted for respectively 30.6%, 8.8% and 13.8%. Although the enterprise 
community has grown rapidly during the past decade, the number of officially registered 
enterprises remains relatively low. By 2002 approximately 63,000 enterprises had been 
registered under the new Enterprise Law of which 8.5% were state owned, 87.8% non-state 
owned, and 3.7% foreign invested enterprises. A large part (about 95%) of the registered 
enterprises can be characterized as SMEs, and according to Sakai and Takada (2000) some 60% 
of the job creation takes place in the SME sector. However, only a small fraction of household 
businesses is registered. This means that around 30 million employees or some 87% of the total 
labor force (GSO, 2004) are not well captured in the official statistics. They nevertheless form a 
critically important part of the SME sector, both in terms of job and income creation. 
 
The promotion of SMEs has received strong support from the Vietnamese government. Action 
plans to improve the business sector environment have been actively pursued and the priority of 
private sector and enterprise development is clearly reflected in the 2001-2005 Social Economic 
Development Strategy and in the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy 
(CPRGS). SME promotion, particularly in rural areas, is also regularly referred to as a priority 
area of the Vietnamese government to underpin the economic growth process. 
 
International institutions such as the World Bank and UNDP have targeted considerable 
assistance to SME-development, based on the argument that SMEs are beneficial for 
productivity, innovations and economic efficiency. Direct government support may therefore in 
this line of thinking help exploit the benefits from greater competition and entrepreneurship, and 
given that SMEs are arguably more labor intensive, subsidizing SMEs seem to represent an 
effective approach to further poverty alleviation. However, benefits of subsidizing SMEs are 
subject to debate. Exploiting economies of scale and conducting research and development 
(R&D) is often more feasible for large enterprises. Given that these features may induce 
positive productivity effects, it is not clear a priori that SMEs have the optimal firm size. 
Moreover, it is not self evident why SMEs should do better in terms of job creation and be more 
labor intensive. Large firms may be less vulnerable to external shocks and therefore may 
provide more job security than smaller firms.  
   2
In this paper, we enquire how well observed owner- and firm-characteristics predict the survival 
and growth performance of SMEs, relying on a three partly overlapping survey data sets from 
1991, 1997 and 2002,  covering 2,576 Vietnamese SMEs in seven provinces. We find that 
smaller firms grow more rapidly, which is in line with most of the existing theoretical and 
empirical literature. However, in other dimensions such as the importance of firm age for 
growth and firm size for survival, Vietnam does not follow the standard pattern. We also ask 
whether government support to the SME sector in Vietnam has improved enterprise 
performance in terms of firm survival and growth, and we analyze whether government 
assistance during establishment is more efficient for firm survival than assistance given to 
operating firms. It emerges that government credit support during start-up has had a positive 
impact on the revenue growth rate. It also appears that the importance of this kind of support is 
diminishing for new firms, whereas legal advice seems to be gaining influence on firm 
dynamics. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature on firm survival and growth. Section 3 describes our survey and 
sampling methodology and provides various descriptive statistics on firm dynamics in Vietnam. 
Section 4 presents results, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature  Review 
Sutton (1997), Caves (1998), and Audretsch and Klepper (2000) have recently summarized the 
existing theoretical and empirical insights about firm dynamics. They note that a small firm has 
a lower likelihood of survival and at the same time firm size is found to be negatively related to 
growth. This evidence (mostly concerned with developed countries) amounts in the words of 
Geroski (1995) to a stylized fact, which contradicts the often cited Gibrat’s Law.  
 
The empirically observed positive relationship between firm size and the likelihood of survival 
can be interpreted theoretically within the framework of noisy selection introduced by 
Jovanovic (1982). This contribution can be characterized as a passive learning model in which 
information is gathered at no cost. Entrants do not know their own cost structure and assuming 
that firms differ with regard to efficiency, they incur different costs when producing the same 
levels of output. Since entrants do not know their exact abilities their performance is unknown, 
so each participant has to go through a learning process, accumulating information from actual 
market experience. Entrepreneurs gradually discover whether their abilities are good enough to 
meet prior expectations, and if not they will typically exit the industry. Consequently, in the 
model of Jovanovic (1982) efficient firms survive and experience growth, whereas over-
optimistic firms eventually close down. The longer a firm has been in the market the more 
knowledge it has about its own abilities, so in this model the probability of survival is positively 
related to firm age. In sum, Jovanovic predicts that firm survival increases with size and age.    3
 
A critique of the Jovanovic approach is that he assumes no technological progress. Ericson and 
Pakes (1995) therefore propose to extend the analytical framework to a model of active learning 
where technological advances are allowed for. Firms are aware of the distribution of their 
profits, but they are uncertain about the profitability of a given innovation. This is due to the 
random outcomes of innovations and actions of other actors in the market. Firms explore the 
market actively and invest in order to enhance productivity. The firm survives and grows if 
successful firms grow and otherwise they will eventually exit the industry. Pakes and Ericson 
(1998) have subsequently shown that the passive learning model fits the description of the retail 
sector, while the active learning model turns out to be more appropriate for the manufacturing 
sector. However, as Caves (1998) argues, the passive and active learning models need not be 
mutually exclusive.    
 
Besides firm age and size, it has also been suggested that firm level innovations should be 
considered a driving force behind firm dynamics. In Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) 
experienced firms are more capable of pursuing innovations, and during the process of 
technological change technological laggards exit because successful innovators force down 
prices. Moreover, Klepper (1996) argues that firm size and the ability to appropriate returns 
from innovations may be related. He highlights the importance of firm size in appropriating 
returns from innovations and, in his analytical framework, price declines eventually limit further 
entry so older firms with the best innovative capabilities get larger shares of the industry output. 
 
Jovanovic (1993) focuses specifically on the issue of diversification and discusses how this can 
improve the probability of survival. Gaining market power, avoiding risk, having access to 
funds, making products compatible and reaping efficiency gains are in his view some of the 
potential benefits from diversification. He develops a general equilibrium model of the degree 
of diversification by firms, and it turns out that it is more efficient to make two products rather 
than one at a larger scale.  
 
Liedholm and Mead (1999) point out that the above theoretical models are somewhat limited in 
their choice of explanatory variables. There are other important variables, which may affect firm 
dynamics, and the key determinants of managerial ability are also left out. Consequently, in 
generating more comprehensive hypotheses about the determinants of firm dynamics the analyst 
must ultimately move beyond variables identified in the theoretical literature, seeking 
inspiration from empirical sources.  
 
The empirical evidence from developed countries about firm dynamics is substantial. However 
until the papers by Hall (1987), Evans (1987a, 1987b) and Dunne et al. (1988, 1989) 
econometric problems regarding heteroscedasticity, specification and sample censoring were not 
properly addressed. Controlling for these problems, it emerges that larger firms have lower   4
growth, but a larger probability of survival, consistent with the predictions of the Jovanovic 
(1982) model. Doms, Dunne and Roberts (1995) also support this result by showing that older 
and larger firms in the US manufacturing sector have higher survival rates and lower growth 
rates. Controlling for capital intensity, productivity, and technology usage does not change the 
results. Studies covering other countries (Mata et al., 1994 and Baldwin, 1995) confirm that the 
length of survival is a function of entrant and industry characteristics.  
 
Regarding innovative firms Gort and Klepper (1982) show that technological and knowledge 
conditions determine the relative ease with which new firms are able to innovate and therefore 
survive. Complementing this study, Audretsch (1991, 1995) suggests that technological 
opportunities are very important in the long run for new firm competitiveness. More 
specifically, considering the US manufacturing sector he finds that in industries where small 
firms have a relatively higher innovation rate as compared to larger firms the survival rate of 
small firms is higher. Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) also suggest that the relationship between 
the likelihood of survival and firm size is dependent on technology and on the stage of the 
industry life cycle. Moreover, as documented by Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) exit hazard is 
greater in more innovative industries and evidence suggests that the probability of exiting is 
higher when industry unemployment is high. Yet, this is more so for new establishments than 
among diversifying entrants.  
 
Although evidence from developed countries is substantial it is not clear whether the above 
conclusions concerning firm dynamics carry over to developing countries. First of all, Tybout 
(2000) documents, in an excellent survey of the empirical literature concerning manufacturing 
firms in developing countries, that there is no serious scale inefficiency problem in developing 
countries. Survey based evidence suggests that the potential efficiency gains from increasing 
plant size are probably much smaller than one might think. Moreover, Söderbom and Teal 
(2004) show for firms in Ghana’s manufacturing sector that human capital does not appear to be 
quantitatively important in determining productivity. Liedholm and Mead (1998, 1999) have 
made great efforts to uncover the characteristics of the African region. Using data from eight 
countries they confirm that firm age and firm size are important variables in analyzing the 
enterprise life cycle. Location, composition of activities, labor force characteristics and gender 
of the entrepreneur also turn out as important determinants of firm survival and growth. 
McPherson (1996) looks at five African countries, and his findings confirm that the level of 
human capital, location, sector, and gender are important determinants of growth. Consistent 
with the results obtained from analyzing developed countries he also finds an inverse 
relationship between enterprise growth and firm age and size, respectively. In a related paper, 
McPherson (1995) finds that the Jovanovic (1982) theory of firm evolution does not hold in his 
sample of four African countries. Size and the probability of exiting the industry are not 
negatively related. Moreover, Daniels and Mead (1998) show somewhat surprisingly that 
location and access to credit do not seem to influence the levels of profit significantly in Kenya.   5
In addition, they document that higher education and being a male entrepreneur are associated 
with higher profit levels. Hence, in the African regional context standard theories of firm 
dynamics may be inadequate.  
 
Liedholm (2002) investigates the determinants of survival and growth of SMEs in Africa and 
Latin America. Firms located in urban and commercial areas are more likely to survive and 
human capital also plays a crucial role. Again size and growth are central features in describing 
firm dynamics. Sector, location and gender also play a significant role in determining enterprise 
growth. In particular, it is shown, that enterprises run by male entrepreneurs grow more rapidly 
than those run by females.  
 
Turning to the Asian region, Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) found in a survey of Indonesian 
medium and large scale manufacturing enterprises that older and larger firms survive. 
Furthermore, surviving firms were in more concentrated industries and in industries with a 
larger participation of foreign firms. In a recent special issue of Small Business Economics
1 a 
collection of papers examined the evolution of SMEs in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, Indonesia 
and Thailand. The general message from these studies is that the determinants of firm dynamics 
are basically the same as the ones considered in both developed and other developing countries. 
However, it is suggested that government policy interventions have played a significant role in 
the explanation of SME successes in the Asian region.  
 
Finally, to our knowledge there is only one study on firm dynamics in Vietnam. Using the 
1992/93 and 1997/98 Vietnamese Household Living Standard Measurement Survey (VLSS), 
Vijverberg and Haughton (2002) show that non-farm household enterprises have a higher 
probability of survival the larger and the older the enterprise is. Moreover, the likelihood of 
survival decreases the further south the enterprise is located.  
 
The general picture emerging from the above review is one of widespread support for the 
evolutionary theory of Jovanovic (1982). The probability of survival increases with size and 
age, but larger and older firms tend to experience lower growth rates. Furthermore, it also 
appears that characteristics regarding the owner (education and gender), firm (location, 
ownership form and sector) and production (innovation, diversification in terms of demand and 
supply, and capital intensity) play an important role in explaining firm dynamics. In what 
follows, we rely on the above framework to study SME firm dynamics in Vietnam and discuss 
how this country fits into the general pattern. 
 
                                                 
1 Small Business Economics issue no. 18. See Iqbal and Urata (2002) for an overview.   6
3. Data 
The data used in this paper were generated by enterprise surveys conducted in 1991, 1997 and 
2002 covering the 1990/91, 1995/96 and the 2000/01 years, respectively.
2 The surveys were 
carried out in collaboration between the Institute of Labor Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) 
in the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) in Vietnam, on the one hand, 
and the Stockholm School of Economics and the University of Copenhagen, on the other. The 
1991 survey included some 450 non-state enterprises in three major cities, Ho Chi Minh City 
(HCMC), Hanoi and Haiphong. In 1997, a repeat survey of the same enterprises, and a parallel 
survey of another 500 enterprises not previously studied were carried out, covering five 
provinces (Long An and Ha Tay in addition to the previous areas analyzed). The period from 
1991 to 1997 was characterized by a move from market fragmentation towards market 
integration and gradually increasing competition. In this way, the two surveys brought to light a 
highly dynamic and often dramatic process of change, not captured by more aggregate analyses 
(Ronnås and Ramamurthy, 2001). The approval of the new Enterprise Law in 2000 provided 
further impetus to the development of the non-state enterprise sector, and a firmer legal basis for 
SME operations was created. The 2002 survey covering over 1,600 enterprises in seven 
provinces (Quang Nam and Phu Tho in addition to the previous areas analyzed) was therefore 
conducted in order to analyze the effects of the changes in the economic environment 
surrounding the SME sector.
3 
 
In all the areas and years covered by the surveys, the samples were stratified by ownership 
forms to ensure the inclusion of all non-state types of enterprises, including household, private, 
partnership and co-operative firms. According to the national enterprise survey conducted by 
the General Statistical Office (GSO, 2004), in which there are no household enterprises, 
establishments are mostly concentrated in HCMC (23%), Hanoi (15%) and Haiphong (9%). 
GSO also reports that state enterprises comprise 9% compared to the non-state sector share of 
88%.
4 On the other hand, a recent SME survey for Vietnam (Sakai and Takada, 2000) 
documents that the main part of their companies is characterized as household enterprises. In 
establishing the stratification, we combined these two sources, which suggest, first, that 
household enterprises account for about 70% of the enterprises (Sakai and Takada, 2000), and 
second, that the 30% non-household (and non-state) enterprises can be divided as follows (GSO, 
                                                 
2 The World Bank SME Department currently operates with three groups of small and medium-sized 
enterprises: micro-, small-, and medium-scale firms. Micro-enterprises have up to 10 employees, small-
scale enterprises up to 50 employees, and medium-sized enterprises up to 300 employees. These 
definitions are broadly accepted by the Vietnamese Government (see
 Government decree no. 90/2001/CP-
ND on “Supporting for Development of Small and Medium Enterprises”). In the following we apply 
these definitions. 
3 While a few state SMEs were surveyed, they have been excluded in the present analysis, which focuses 
on non-state SMEs. 
4 Note that GSO (2004) only captures enterprises registered under the Enterprise Law or State-owned 
Enterprise Law; cooperatives registered under the Cooperative Laws; and household businesses if they 
meet the requirements under Decree No.91/2001/CP-ND.   7
2004): Private enterprises (39%), co-operatives (7%), limited companies (37%), joint-stock 
companies (4%) and foreign invested (4%). Finally, one of the challenges in terms of 
stratification was to capture the transformation of the private sector that took place during the 
1990s. New categories of private enterprises (especially limited liability companies) appeared 
and the nature of co-operatives changed fundamentally. These changes therefore had to be taken 
into account in the design of the 1997 and 2002 surveys, so the shares of the various enterprise 
categories were adjusted.  
 
For reasons of implementation the surveys were confined to specific areas in each province/city. 
Subsequently, the samples were drawn randomly from a complete list of enterprises, where the 
stratified sampling procedure was used to ensure the inclusion of an adequate number of 
enterprises with different ownership forms. Finally, while stratification was adjusted over time, 
other aspects, including the questionnaires, were maintained virtually identical among the three 
surveys.
5 Consequently, the data obtained allow, in principle, an analysis of the dynamics of 
Vietnamese manufacturing SMEs between 1990 and 2002. In what follows, we mainly 
concentrate on the period 1995/96-2000/01 as the number and coverage of surviving firms from 
1990/91 is limited as discussed further below. 
 
A small sample selection bias may be present as samples were not selected exactly proportional 
to the (unknown) number of enterprises in the country. Furthermore due to the partial sampling 
nature of the panel data set, and because the sampling was based on a pre-existing sample from 
1991 and 1997, it is likely there is a slight bias against young, newly established enterprises. 
Additional details on the surveys and sampling procedures can be found in Ronnås and 
Ramamurthy (2001) and in Rand et al. (forthcoming).  
 
Table 1 summarizes the growth and survival experiences of the enterprises covered by the 1991, 
1997 and 2002 surveys. Of the 447 enterprises initially surveyed in 1991 only 36% survived to 
1997 while 21% survived all the way to 2002. Of the 750 enterprises initially surveyed in 1997, 
64% survived to the 2002 survey, whereas only 58% ((93/159)*100) of the enterprises initially 
surveyed in 1991 survived from 1997 to 2002. The overall picture indicates that the business 
environment in terms of survival has changed during the last decade, which corresponds well 
with the economic reform process in Vietnam in general and the introduction of the 2000 
Enterprise Law, in particular.
6 Looking at the short run growth rates in real gross revenue and in 
employment it appears that incumbent firms have lower short run growth rates than new 
entrants.
7 For example, in 2002 the mean short run growth rate of surviving firms was 
substantially lower than growth for firms not previously surveyed (younger firms in general). 
                                                 
5 The 2002 questionnaire was expanded, but included the same questions as in 1991 and 1997. 
6 See Central Institute of Economic Management (2004) for details. 
7 The short run growth rates refer to the annual growth rates from 1990 to 1991; 1995 to 1996 and from 
2000 to 2001 whereas long run growth rates represent the average annual growth rates from one survey 
period to another.    8
Notice also that both short and long run growth rates in terms of real gross revenue have been 
substantial, whereas growth rates measured in terms of number of employees show a stagnating 
tendency.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In what follows we concentrate on firm dynamics based on the 1997 and 2002 surveys. Vietnam 
underwent dramatic transitional changes from 1986 to 1992, which may have had a “non-
standard” influence on the business environment during this period. Hence, the 1991 survey will 
in all likelihood not be representative of the SME sector in Vietnam today. A second, more 
technical, reason for the data limitation is that only 93 enterprises survived from 1991 to 2002 
(Table 1). Even though these are interesting enterprises, the small sample size limits the 
usefulness of the data in econometric analyses. 
 
Transition matrices are often used as a powerful tool to evaluate the economic mobility of firms, 
and they give an indication of the high degree of turbulence in the Vietnamese SME sector. 
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate firm dynamics both in terms of number of employees and real gross 
revenue. The Tables show that more than 60% of the enterprises in the lowest quintile in the 
1997 survey remained in the lowest quintile group in the 2002 survey. Similarly, the top quintile 
group of enterprises in 1997 demonstrates a relatively strong tendency to stay among the larger 
companies (between 57% and 68%).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
There is considerable movement among quintiles 2, 3 and 4, i.e. middle sized enterprises. This 
may not be particularly surprising given that companies in these categories can move in both 
directions, but it is nevertheless clear that the Vietnamese non-state SME business environment 
is in general highly dynamic. 
   9
4.  Econometric Analysis of Firm Growth and Survival  
In this section we turn to an econometric analysis of survival and growth based on the 1997 and 
2002 surveys. The questions in focus in what follows are: 1) What are the determinants of 
Vietnamese SME growth and survival? and 2) Does government assistance play an important 
role for firm dynamics? 
 
4.1  Determinants of Firm Growth and Survival 
The literature survey identified a number of potential determinants for survival and growth of 
SMEs. From the 1997 and 2002 questionnaires information on these determinants can be 
obtained. Descriptive statistics of the determinants used in the econometric analyses are listed in 
Table 4. To ease the discussion in the following the determinants are gathered in five groups.  
 
In line with the literature review, the first group is the key determinants; firm age (in years) and 
firm size (respectively number of employees and real gross revenue). The (geometric) average 
firm age fell from 13.5 years in 1995/96 to 9 years in 2000/01, with some increase in the 
standard deviation, as could be expected since a fraction of the firms in 2000/01 includes 
survivors from 1995/96 (and even from 1990/91). As regards the size of the enterprises, Table 4 
shows that the geometric average real revenue dropped from VND 200 million to around VDN  
160 million (both in 1994-prices) whereas the geometric average number of employees fell from 
9 to 7. Hence, the average revenue per average employee is fairly constant in the two surveys. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The second group of determinants includes characteristics of the owner. Enterprises are 
primarily owned by men, whose share change from 76% in 1995/96 to 78% in 2000/01. 
Regarding measures of the level of human capital, we combined information on average 
educational level of the enterprise owner and data on whether the owner had any longer-term 
formal or informal experience prior to establishing the firm. On this basis, we categorized skills 
as high, medium or low,
8 and from Table 4 it appears that that the average number of highly 
skilled owners decreased slightly from the 1997 to the 2002 survey. This suggests that entry 
requirements in terms of skill level of the owner have gone down, reflecting the much larger 
number of household enterprises in the sample. However, the data also confirm that on average 
more than 70% of the owners are medium or highly skilled. This is relatively high in a 
                                                 
8 The owner was classified as being highly skilled if he had either more than 12 years of schooling or 
prior long-term formal experience in the line of business in question. Medium skilled owners have formal 
education between 8 and 12 years or prior long-term informal experience in the particular line of 
business. Finally, low skilled owners have either no prior experience or less than 8 years of schooling. 
This is in line with the approach taken in other studies of SME dynamics in developing countries such as 
Liedholm and Mead (1999).   10
developing country perspective, but in line with the generally high educational level of the 
Vietnamese labor force. 
 
The third group of determinants in Table 4 identifies a core set of firm specific characteristics, 
related to ownership structure, location and sector/activity. Location is modeled using indicator 
variables representing each area. The 1997 survey covered HCMC, Hanoi, Haiphong, Ha Tay 
and Long An, and in 2002 the provinces of Phu Tho and Quang Nam were included to reflect 
the rural business environment. In the two surveys the number of enterprises interviewed was 
(more or less) equally divided among provinces. Most noticeable in this category of 
determinants is that the number of household enterprises increased significantly from 45% in 
the 1997 survey to 71% in 2002. One obvious reason for this is that legal definitions of 
enterprise types changed during the survey periods, so some enterprises listed as private in 1997 
were classified as household enterprises in 2002. Finally, a set of sector indicators is included at 
the two-digit Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) level. The number of enterprises at 
SITC level zero, representing “Food and Live Animals”, increased from 18% in 1995/96 to 
around 24% in 2000/01. Other specifics regarding sector definitions are reported in Appendix 
A. 
 
The fourth group of determinants consists of other indicators identified in the literature survey 
as important for firm dynamics in other developing and more industrialized countries. These 
determinants include the extent to which the enterprise is innovative and diversify (both in 
terms of supply and demand), as well as the level of technology used in production (hand tools, 
manual machinery and power machinery). A firm is said to be innovative if it has made 
significant improvements of existing products or has started production of a new product during 
the past two years. From Table 4 it appears that the average innovation rate has dropped a little, 
consistent with the larger share of smaller household enterprises. Diversification in supply and 
demand, respectively, is based on whether the enterprise produces more than one product (a 
diversification indicator) and the number of customers.
9 Diversification is generally expected to 
make firms less vulnerable to shocks thereby increasing the probability of survival. The average 
degree of diversification in supply increased from 24% in 1995/96 to 44% in 2000/01, in 
comparison the customer base remained largely constant (72% had more than 10 customers in 
1995/96 compared to 77% in 2000/01). Finally, it would appear that SMEs are increasingly 
relying on more capital intensive technology in production. For example, the share of 
enterprises using power driven machinery, increased from 18% to 22%.
10  
 
The final group of determinants in Table 4 includes indicator variables capturing government 
assistance during respectively start-up (5A) and operation (5B). Assistance during start-up, 
                                                 
9 Customer1: Only one customer, Customer2: Between 2 and 10 customers, and Customer3: More than 10 
customers. 
10 An increase in the capital intensity variable, defined as log real assets over employment, confirms this.   11
which increased its coverage significantly from 50% of the enterprises in 1995/1996 to 85% in 
2000/01, includes government advice or recommendations on the line of business to adopt 
(Recommendation), assistance in completing applications and registration procedures 
(Registration), assistance in obtaining credit (Credit start-up), and tax exemptions or tax 
reduction offers (Tax). Assistance during operation covered 19% in 1995/96 as compared to 
34% in 2000/01. This includes for example solving managerial difficulties (Management), 
assistance in obtaining credit (Credit Operation) and providing legal advice (Legal advice). 
 
Using the determinants described in this section as the gross list we analyze, econometrically, 
which of the determinants had a significant impact on survival and revenue growth from 
1995/96 to 2000/01 in the next section. 
 
4.2  Regression Results for Survival and Growth 1995/96 to 2000/01 
The joint analysis of firm survival and growth from 1995/96 to 2000/01 is performed using a 
sample selection model. Hence, we record if enterprises survived from 1995/95 to 2000/01 and 
conditional on survival we measure the growth rates of employment and real gross revenue, 
respectively. To be specific, the model is 
 
 










where si is the survival indicator and gi the average annual growth rate in either employment or 
in  real gross revenue. The growth and survival determinants, xi, are those discussed in the 
previous section. In the regressions we only include observations from the 1997 survey to 
ensure exogeneity of the determinants. In the employment growth regressions, the size variable 
is the (log of) employment; in the revenue growth regressions it is the (log of) real revenue (as 
stated, both variables are from the 1997 survey; hence it is the initial size). The error term in the 
survival equation, ui, is assumed to be standard normal, and we assume linearity of the 
relationship between ui and vi, E( | ) ii i vu u γ = .  
 
Table 5 presents regression results for both employment and revenue growth. In the 
employment regressions there are 689 enterprises with complete data in the 1997 survey; 446 of 
these enterprises were still operating and recorded in the 2002 survey (survivors). In the revenue 
regressions there are two observations less, because of missing data for revenue, and as seen the 
two enterprises are among the survivors. Below we briefly present and discuss the regression 
results, organizing the discussion according to the five groups of determinants defined in the 
previous section. 
   12
First of all, there is a statistically significant indication of firm size being negatively related to 
firm growth both in the revenue and employment equations.
11 This corresponds well with the 
results obtained in most of the theoretical and empirical literature on firm dynamics. However, 
the probability of survival does not appear to be positively related to size. This puts Vietnam at 
odds with results from studies of other countries. For firm age we record the reverse result as 
the probability of survival is significantly related to age while revenue growth is not; the 
precision of the age impact on survival is not overwhelming, though. One possible explanation 
for the weak results for firm age may be that most of the firms in the sample are relatively 
young and, moreover, that Vietnamese firms operate in a rapidly evolving and unstable 
environment.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Turning to the second group of determinants (owner characteristics) it appears that human 
capital is an important determinant of firm growth. Firms with owners who have high skills are 
likely to experience larger growth rates than firms with low skilled owners. This confirms the 
results in McPherson (1996) that experience gained in other business is useful for growth of 
SMEs, and reflects that owners in Vietnam act as managers, designers etc. and they also ensure 
quality control. The data also suggest that there is no significant influence from being medium 
skilled (as compared to having low skills) on firm growth, and skill level is not a significant 
determinant of survival rates. Finally, the data confirm that gender of the owner is not 
significant for firm success (growth or survival), which is in line with the observation that there 
appears to be no, or at least relatively limited, gender discrimination between men and women 
in Vietnam once they own a firm. 
 
Looking at firm characteristics it is clear that location is of significant importance in 
determining firm survival. The probability of survival in rural areas (Ha Tay and Long An) is 
higher than in urban areas (recall that the base is HCMC). This suggests that competition in 
urban areas is far more pronounced, and from the survey it is clear that enterprises see fierce 
competition as the largest constraint to enterprise growth.
12 This result is furthermore in line 
with the fact that there are substantial and widely recognized administrative and structural 
barriers to entry in Ha Tay and Long An where local governments are distinctly protective of 
existing firms. Firms in Ha Tay and Long An are also more oriented towards serving local 
markets and therefore tend to escape some of the survival risks inherent in larger, possibly more 
outward oriented markets. In terms of growth, there is an indication that enterprises in Hanoi 
                                                 
11 In the literature diminishing returns to age and size modelled by including size squared, are often found 
significant. However, these second order terms were uninformative in our analysis. They are therefore 
excluded in what follows.  
12 In 1997 73% of the enterprises in HCMC responded that too much competition was the major 
constraint to the enterprise, whereas only 41% in Ha Tay and 50% in Long An listed competition as a 
problem (see Rand et al., forthcoming, for further details).   13
experience higher growth rates in employment as compared to HCMC. Technology choices in 
Hanoi have until now been more labor intensive than in HCMC. Hence given a similar real 
revenue growth experience in both regions, the employment growth will be higher in Hanoi. 
Finally, the observation that there are no significant differences among the provinces in our 
survey when it comes to growth in revenue is in all likelihood explained by the fact that 
Vietnam has experienced significant and broad-based growth in the last 10-15 years. While 
markets and opportunities do admittedly seem to expand more in urban areas, there also tends to 
be more competition as discussed above. 
 
The ownership legal structure of the firm also seems to be an important determinant for firm 
growth in Vietnam. Non-household (private, cooperative and limited/share-holding) companies 
experience significantly higher revenue growth rates than the smaller household enterprises. 
This is not altogether surprising. For example, household enterprises will only register formally 
if they have either a clear sense of direction and an intention to expand or some positive growth 
experience in recent years that makes registration worthwhile.  
 
For the production sectors it appears that firms producing machinery for a particular industry 
(SITC72), electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances (SITC77) and prefabricated buildings 
and fixtures (SITC81) have significantly lower employment growth compared to enterprises 
engaging in food and live animals (SITC0). For growth in revenue, however, it matters little in 
which sector the SMEs operate. The only sector that stands out is plastic manufactures (SITC5), 
which is no surprise. This sector produces much of the packing and other material, which is in 
very high demand at the present stage of the Vietnam’s development. 
 
Turning to innovations and diversification little of significance emerges. This is surprising in 
relation to other studies, but appears to reflect basic characteristics of the SME sector in 
Vietnam. While Vietnamese SMEs are not yet subjected to severe competitive pressures from 
the outside world, a domestic innovator will very quickly be copied by other domestic SMEs, 
such that the premium on innovating is limited. The same goes for the degree of diversification. 
Another observation for this group of determinants is that the manual machinery category on 
average experienced lower growth rates in employment. Ignoring SMEs relying on hand tools 
(mainly including small household enterprises), this result is consistent with the observation that 
firms, which are more capital intensive often grow faster (not reported). Similar results have 
been obtained for the US (Audretsch, 1995), and for Vietnam, a common observation is that the 
government tends to be relatively more protective, the higher the degree of capital intensity. 
 
Finally determinants describing assistance from the government either during start-up or during 
the daily operation of the firm give some interesting results. First of all none of the government 
variables are significant when it comes to survival. However, in terms of growth, there are two 
statistically significant determinants. During start-up government credit plays a positive role in   14
promoting revenue growth. This may be related with the widely shared perception that credit is 
a constraint on SME growth. If so, it demonstrates that the Vietnamese government has been 
successful in limiting this constraint through its credit programs during start-up where 
enterprises have fewer contacts and experience. In contrast, tax exemptions during start-up 
appear to have had a significantly negative impact on growth in employment. This negative 
impact may be due to self-selection problems in the tax exemption. If enterprises experiencing 
problems have been more active in applying for tax exemptions than other enterprises one 
would expect the negative sign. 
  
4.3  Government Support and Gross Revenue 
The two surveys in 1997 and 2002 have information about real revenue growth in the 
enterprises in the years they were surveyed. This means that we are able to analyze if 
government support programs affected revenues both in surviving 1997-enterprises and in non-
surviving enterprises and, in addition, we can analyze the new group of enterprises included in 
the 2002 survey. The latter group is, for a large part, new enterprises. 
 
The model for the short run growth rate in real gross revenue does not have a sample selection 
problem as the growth rates are observed for all enterprises. Even so, we report least squares 
regression results both for all firms in each survey and for three sub-groups; the 1995/96-non-
survivors, the 1995/96-survivors, and the new firms in the 2000/01 survey. This sample split 
may provide a more complete picture of the impact of government support. 
 
Regressions (1) to (3) in Table 6 report the results for the 1997 survey. The regressions give an 
indication of (mild) self-selection in credit during operation as the growth impact of this credit 
support is almost twice as high in the non-survivor group compared to the survivor group. 
However, for both groups as well as for the full sample (i.e., the joint sample) there is a 
significantly positive impact of credit during operation on short-term revenue growth. A 
comparison with the impact on the average growth rate of revenues in Table 5 shows that the 
short run impact is somewhat larger than the long run impact. Another interesting result from 
the 1997 survey is that legal advice is only significant for the non-survivors, and it has a 
negative impact for this group. This may indicate that legal advice was mainly demanded by 
enterprises experiencing legal problems, which may ultimately have led to close-down. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
The results for the 2002 survey (using the 2002 determinants) are given in Regressions (4)-(6). 
Using this survey, the positive impact of credit support during operation is no longer significant 
when all firms are analyzed jointly, but the sample split shows that the result is mainly driven 
by the highly insignificant impact of credit support for the new firms. In contrast, the survivors   15
still report a positive impact of the support in 2000/01. One possible interpretation of this result 
is that the credit market has developed significantly from 1995/96 to 2000/01. Hence, new 
enterprises may seek credit from state owned commercial banks or trading partners instead of 
government credit. In fact, as seen from Regression (5), none of the government support 
variables are statistically significant for revenue growth in new enterprises. This is not due to 
the sample size as there are about 500 new enterprises in the 2002 survey. Legal advice is now 
significant for the survivor group, and it has a positive impact. This is a marked change 
compared to the results for the 1997 survey. It may be driven either by a need from survivors to 
understand the changes in the enterprise, tax and land laws or possibly by (successful) demand 
for advice regarding entrance into new markets. The latter explanation has some indirect support 
in the data as Table 4 shows that the share of firms producing more than one good 
(diversification) has increased from 24% in the 1997 survey to 44% in the 2002 survey. 
 
Regressions (7) and (8) are used to test if the changes in the results for the surviving firms are 
driven by the changes in the samples.
13 The regressions show that the point estimate of the 
impact of credit support during operation is unchanged in the two surveys although the estimate 
is not well determined in the 1997 sample. Even so we conjecture that the impact has been 
constant, and the correspondence to the impact on long run growth is noteworthy. In sum, credit 
during operation was a significant growth determinant for SMEs in the past and continues 
important for survivors. But, based on the results for the new firms in the 2002 survey the 
importance of this support appears to be decreasing. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have studied the association between the characteristics of Vietnamese small 
and medium sized enterprises and their growth potential and probability of survival, relying on 
partly overlapping survey data sets with detailed information about firm characteristics. Using 
both employment growth rates and real gross revenue growth rates from 1995/96 to 2000/01, we 
found support for the life cycle theories of Jovanovic (1982) in the sense that smaller firms tend 
to grow more rapidly than bigger firms, and older firms are more likely to survive. While 
Vietnam is typical in this respect, we did not find support for a negative relationship between 
firm age and growth. Moreover, the negative effect of small size on survival is also absent. 
Thus, small firms grow fast while they seem to survive on par with bigger firms, given the age 
structure. 
 
In addition to the impact of size and age, we confirmed the findings of previous empirical 
studies. Skill, location, ownership forms and the type of activity in which the firm engages are 
                                                 
13 Not all surviving firms have complete data information in both 1997 and 2002. Therefore, there is 
considerable sample variation even in the survivor group. As seen from Table 6, there are actually only 
284 firms with complete data in both surveys.   16
significant determinants of firm dynamics, also in the case of Vietnam. One result, which is 
specific to Vietnam compared to other developing countries, is an absence of gender 
discrimination. As regards location, we found a higher probability of survival in the rural 
regions in the sample while there was no significant difference in the growth rates of 
employment and gross revenue across regions. For ownership forms it appeared clearly from the 
data that modern non-household enterprises, on average, experienced higher growth rates than 
household enterprises. 
 
Finally, in addition to the traditional indicators explaining the enterprise life cycle, we analyzed 
the effect of government support on the survival and growth of the SMEs. Our results indicate 
that government credit support to firms has been an important determinant of firm growth. A 
closer look at this result revealed a significant difference between older firms (i.e., firms 
surviving from 1997 to 2002) and new firms included in the 2002 survey. Government credit 
was positively related to growth in the 1997 survey, while there was no significant impact of 
this kind of government support for the growth rates of new enterprises interviewed in the 2002 
survey. Legal advice was another kind of government support on which we had information. 
While this kind of support was negatively related to growth among the non-surviving firms in 
the 1997 survey, probably due to self-selection, there was a strong positive impact of legal 
advice among the surviving firms in 2002. Hence, the allocation and impact of various forms of 
government support to SMEs in Vietnam appears as an interesting area for future research.   17
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Firm Dynamics 
         1990/1991  1995/1996  2000/2001 
       Employment  Revenue Employment  Revenue  Employment  Revenue 
1990/1991 Survival  447  159  (36%)  93  (21%) 
  Short run Growth (%)  -4.6  23.5  -3.3  5.1  -0.9  4.8 
  Long run Growth (%)  na  na  0.2  16.2  -1.3  1.0 
1995/1996 Survival      591  377  (64%) 
  Short run Growth (%)      3.0  10.4  0.1  5.8 
  Long run Growth (%)      na  na  1.3  4.3 
2000/2001 Survival          909 




























   Long run Growth (%)          na  na 
   Total   Surveyed  447  750  1379 
    Short run Growth (%)  -4.6  23.5  1.7  9.3  2.3  10.5 
      Long run Growth (%)  na  na  0.2  16.2  0.9  3.7 
Note: In 1997 around 1,000 enterprises were surveyed, and in 2002 the sample size was around 1,600 enterprises. Employment is log to the number of
employees, revenue is log real gross revenue, and long and short run growth is respectively annual and period to period growth rates.   21
Table 2: Employment Transition Matrix  
Employment Transition Matrix 1995/96 - 2000/01 
   Quintile  2000/01 
    1 2  3  4 5  Total 
1  61  30 6  3  0  100 
  (54)  (27) (5)  (3)  (0) (89) 
2 25  35  33 6  1  100 
 (21)  (29)  (27) (5)  (1) (83) 
3 9  15  45  21 10  100 
 (9)  (14)  (43)  (20) (10)  (96) 
4 1  5 27  48  19 100 
 (1)  (5)  (26)  (47)  (18) (97) 































 (1)  (4)  (5)  (20)  (63)  (93) 
 
 
Total  (86) (79)  (106)  (95) (92)  (458) 
Note: All figures are in percentages. Number of observations in parenthesis. 
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Table 3: Revenue Transition Matrix 
Revenue Transition Matrix 1995/96 - 2000/01 
   Quintile  2000/01 
    1 2 3 4 5  Total 
1  63  21 12  4  0  100 
  (57)  (19) (11)  (4)  (0)  (91) 
2 31  41  16 11  1  100 
 (28)  (37)  (15) (10)  (1)  (91) 
3 8  16  36  27 12  100 
 (7)  (15)  (33)  (25) (11)  (91) 
4 0  14  23  33  30 100 
 (0)  (13)  (21)  (30)  (27) (91) 


































 (0)  (5)  (11)  (23)  (52)  (91) 
 
 
Total  (92) (89) (91) (92) (91)  (456) 
Note: All figures are in percentages. Number of observations in parenthesis. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Survival and Growth Determinants 
Group Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1 Size (Employment) 2.244 1.034 1.998 0.975
Size (Revenue) 12.209 1.678 11.981 1.636
Firm Age  2.594 0.457 2.175 0.738
2 High Skilled 0.330 0.471 0.300 0.458
Medium Skilled 0.380 0.486 0.378 0.485
Low Skilled 0.290 0.455 0.322 0.467
Gender 0.761 0.427 0.782 0.413
3 HCMC 0.232 0.422 0.158 0.365
Ha Noi 0.224 0.417 0.170 0.375
Hai Phong 0.195 0.396 0.151 0.358
Ha Tay 0.172 0.378 0.178 0.383
Long An 0.177 0.382 0.163 0.370
Phu Tho na na 0.089 0.285
Quang Nam na na 0.091 0.287
House 0.447 0.497 0.717 0.451
Private 0.201 0.401 0.101 0.301
Co-operative 0.221 0.415 0.077 0.267
Limited/Share 0.131 0.337 0.105 0.307
SITC0 0.182 0.386 0.236 0.425
SITC5 0.039 0.194 0.027 0.162
SITC58 0.026 0.158 0.028 0.166
SITC6 0.034 0.181 0.040 0.196
SITC64 0.065 0.246 0.034 0.182
SITC66 0.031 0.173 0.039 0.193
SITC67 0.047 0.212 0.062 0.241
SITC7 0.092 0.289 0.092 0.289
SITC72 0.049 0.215 0.032 0.176
SITC77 0.038 0.191 0.050 0.219
SITC8 0.086 0.281 0.026 0.158
SITC81 0.024 0.154 0.056 0.230
SITC82 0.163 0.370 0.159 0.366
SITC84 0.088 0.283 0.075 0.263
SITC9 0.038 0.191 0.043 0.203
4 Innovation 0.489 0.500 0.450 0.498
Diversification 0.244 0.430 0.439 0.496
Customer1 0.025 0.155 0.023 0.149
Customer2 0.259 0.438 0.207 0.405
Customer3 0.716 0.451 0.771 0.421
Hand Tool 0.104 0.305 0.110 0.312
Manual Machinery 0.074 0.261 0.049 0.127
Power Machinery 0.176 0.381 0.222 0.416
Combined Technology 0.647 0.478 0.619 0.486
5A Recommend 0.057 0.232 0.094 0.292
Registration 0.198 0.399 0.348 0.477
Credit Start-up 0.052 0.221 0.171 0.377
Tax 0.197 0.398 0.242 0.428
No Start Up Assistance 0.497 0.500 0.146 0.353
5B Management 0.050 0.218 0.034 0.182
Credit Operation 0.100 0.301 0.214 0.410
Legal Advice 0.038 0.191 0.089 0.285
No Operational Assistance 0.812 0.391 0.663 0.473
1995/1996 2000/2001
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Table 5: Regression Results for Survival and Growth from 1995/95 to 2000/01 
Group Variable Coefficient t - statistics Coefficient t - statistics Coefficient t - statistics Coefficient t - statistics
1 Size (Employment) 0.022 0.28 -0.046*** 4.53
Size (Revenue) -0.019 0.36 -0.068*** 5.87
Firm Age 0.248* 1.83 -0.023 1.58 0.243* 1.77 -0.006 0.25
2 High Skill -0.054 0.38 0.019 1.20 -0.053 0.37 0.065** 2.24
Medium Skill -0.145 1.09 0.017 1.27 -0.143 1.07 0.022 0.86
Gender -0.006 0.04 0.002 0.14 0.004 0.03 -0.001 0.04
3 Ha Noi 0.219 1.36 0.045* 1.93 0.194 1.20 -0.040 1.03
Hai Phong 0.095 0.55 0.006 0.22 0.072 0.41 -0.034 0.81
Ha Tay 0.135*** 5.73 0.007 0.24 0.133*** 5.32 -0.003 0.15
Long An 0.887*** 4.16 -0.005 0.22 0.862*** 4.06 -0.068 1.45
Private -0.139 0.79 0.010 0.49 -0.100 0.60 0.061* 1.78
Co-operation -0.189 1.08 0.037 1.62 -0.156 0.96 0.126*** 3.40
Limited/Share -0.183 0.83 0.054* 1.73 -0.140 0.66 0.173*** 3.44
SITC5 -0.088 0.30 0.006 0.15 -0.093 0.31 0.122* 1.81
SITC58 0.224 0.66 0.006 0.10 0.224 0.66 -0.032 0.44
SITC6 0.456 1.42 -0.041 1.15 0.461 1.43 -0.025 0.46
SITC64 0.094 0.37 -0.015 0.42 0.095 0.37 0.023 0.34
SITC66 0.094 0.27 -0.043 0.94 0.091 0.26 -0.082 1.19
SITC67 0.197 0.71 0.001 0.03 0.172 0.62 0.005 0.07
SITC7 0.275 1.22 0.002 0.08 0.265 1.17 0.049 1.08
SITC72 0.149 0.46 -0.035* 1.89 0.131 0.40 -0.057 1.19
SITC77 -0.107 0.36 -0.089** 2.29 -0.120 0.40 -0.068 0.85
SITC8 -0.109 0.50 -0.043* 1.74 -0.122 0.56 -0.039 0.89
SITC81 -0.389 0.98 -0.065*** 2.98 -0.412 1.03 0.003 0.06
SITC82 0.005 0.03 -0.019 0.86 -0.033 0.16 -0.024 0.59
SITC84 -0.359 1.55 -0.045 1.51 -0.367 1.60 -0.052 0.99
SITC9 0.333 1.05 -0.038 1.17 0.308 0.96 0.022 0.27
4 Innovation 0.058 0.50 -0.002 0.16 0.066 0.56 -0.012 0.47
Diversification -0.169 1.24 -0.019 1.05 -0.150 1.11 0.021 0.71
Customers 1 0.068 0.17 0.053 1.00 0.080 0.20 0.075 1.15
Customers 2-10 0.004 0.03 -0.026 1.57 0.008 0.06 -0.017 0.65
Hand Tool -0.190 0.91 0.003 0.13 -0.206 0.97 -0.018 0.47
Manual Machinery -0.035 0.16 -0.060*** 3.33 -0.056 0.26 -0.050 1.21
Power Machinery -0.027 0.19 -0.017 1.03 -0.014 0.10 -0.027 0.87
5 Recommend 0.206 0.82 0.002 0.07 0.216 0.86 0.060 0.96
Registration 0.060 0.39 0.032 1.57 0.081 0.51 0.033 0.91
Credit Start-up -0.170 0.58 0.050 1.61 -0.135 0.46 0.099* 1.80
Tax -0.068 0.49 -0.028* 1.69 -0.061 0.44 -0.015 0.49
Management 0.323 1.26 -0.003 0.09 0.336 1.32 -0.039 0.67
Credit Operation 0.023 0.11 -0.007 0.33 0.039 0.18 0.019 0.50
Legal Advice -0.340 1.21 -0.017 0.42 -0.317 1.13 -0.062 0.67
Number of observations
R-squared
Wald test independent eq.
Robust t-statistics. *, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Base: Low skilled, HCMC, household enterprise, SITC 0, customer > 10, combined, no assistance.
Equation system
0.00 0.20
Employment Real gross revenue
689 687 446 444
Survival Growth Survival Growth
0.11 0.11 0.14 0.16
92.09 77.62 Wald test joint sign., chi2(40)
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Table 6: Regression Results for One-year Revenue Growth Rates 
    1997 survey  2002 survey     Survivors 
      All firms  Non-survivors  Survivors  All firms  New firms  Survivors    Common sample 
Group Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8) 
1 Size  (Revenue)  -0.062***  0.004  -0.095***  -0.045***  -0.089***  0.009    -0.095***  0.008 
   (3.31)  (0.20)  (3.52)  (3.15) (4.23)  (0.55)    (2.95)  (0.42) 
 Firm  Age  -0.068*  -0.142***  -0.031  -0.117***  -0.109***  -0.025    -0.070  -0.015 
   (1.69)  (2.66)  (0.57)  (4.30) (3.41)  (0.72)    (1.21)  (0.38) 
5A Recommend  0.046  0.043  0.159*  0.013  -0.057  -0.001    0.140  0.011 
   (0.59)  (0.31)  (1.73)  (0.20) (0.56)  (0.01)    (1.14)  (0.11) 
 Registration  -0.004  0.015  0.019  0.016  0.065  -0.109*    0.036  -0.117* 
   (0.08)  (0.22)  (0.26)  (0.30) (0.80)  (1.82)    (0.36)  (1.79) 
 Credit  Start-up  0.106  -0.026  0.188  -0.006 0.000  -0.086    0.045  -0.083 
   (1.00)  (0.17)  (1.33)  (0.11) (0.00)  (1.15)    (0.38)  (1.04) 
 Tax    -0.051  -0.016  -0.034  0.032 -0.040  -0.037    -0.047  -0.039 
   (1.34)  (0.23)  (0.75)  (0.75) (0.62)  (0.79)    (0.87)  (0.78) 
5B Management  -0.020  -0.073  -0.057  0.034  0.061  -0.043    0.072  -0.066 
   (0.29)  (0.58)  (0.62)  (0.33) (0.43)  (0.27)    (0.55)  (0.36) 
 Credit  Operation  0.201***  0.254*  0.144* 0.037  0.023  0.112**    0.111  0.112** 
   (2.73)  (1.74)  (1.75)  (1.22) (0.57)  (2.31)    (1.13)  (2.23) 
 Legal  Advice  -0.075 -0.185** -0.113 0.074* 0.041  0.142***    -0.173  0.151** 
   (1.20)  (2.43)  (1.01)  (1.78) (0.063)  (2.68)    (1.02)  (2.54) 
Number of observations  653  231  422  819  503  316    284  284 
R-squared 0.15  0.25  0.21  0.15  0.22  0.16    0.18  0.21 
*, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively      
Base: Low skilled, HCMC, household enterprise, SITC0, customer > 10, combined, no assistance.      
All regressions include group 2, 3 and 4 variables as well as a constant term.  Robust t - statistics in parenthesis.      
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Appendix A: Sector/Activity Specifics 
SITC 1 digit  SITC 2 digit  Description 
0 .. Food and live animals 
5 .. Other chemicals and related products 
5 58  Plastic  manufactures 
6 .. Other manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
6  64  Paper, paperboard, articles thereof 
6  66  Non-metallic min. manufactures n.e.s. 
6 67  Iron  and  steel 
7 .. Other machinery and transport equipment 
7  72  Machinery for part. industries 
7  77  Elec. machinery, app. and appliances 
8 .. Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
8  81  Prefab. buildings; fixtures 
8  82  Furnit., mattr., cushions etc. 
8  84  Apparel and clothing accessories 
9 .. Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC 
   
 